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Case and Comment
C A PA CITY OF IN FA N T S— LIABILITY C O NTR ACTU AL OR DELIC­
T U A L — MOTOR VEHICLE SALE.
The recent decision in Bellefleur v. Noble’s Limited1 illustrates 
the necessity for change in the existing law regarding the legal 
capacity of infants.
Bellefleur, the defendant (appellant), was an infant twenty 
years of age. In June, 1960, he falsely represented to the plaintiff 
(respondent), Noble’s Limited, that he was twenty-one years of 
age, and entered into a contract to purchase a new Volkswagon. 
He paid $330.00 in cash and signed a conditional sales agreement 
for the balance of $1,915.85. After obtaining possession of the 
automobile he drove from Moncton to Cape Bald. While returning 
after midnight he lost control and completely wrecked the auto­
mobile. The defendant advised the plaintiff of the accident and the 
latter towed the wreck to its premises. The defendant refused to 
pay any instalments, repudiated the contract and set up the defence 
of infancy. The plaintiff brought his action in tort claiming that 
the defendant was negligent in his operation of the vehicle.
The trial judge held the defendant liable supporting his deci­
sion mainly on the equitable doctrine of restitution. He found that 
although the conditional sales agreement was voidable by the 
defendant, his right to repudiate the contract was conditional on 
making restitution so as to restore the plaintiff, as nearly as pos­
sible, to its former position. The judge held that the negligent 
driving of the defendant was a wrongful act not contemplated by 
the contract, and that the plaintiff’s action, as framed in negligence, 
was maintainable.
On appeal this decision was reversed in a judgment rendered 
by Ritchie, J., citing R. Leslie Ltd. v. Sheill,2 holding that an infant 
cannot, through a change in the form of action from one ex con­
tractu to one ex delicto, be made liable for the breach of a voidable 
contract. Jennings v. RundaW was also considered, where an infant 
who had hired a mare and injured her by excessive and improper 
riding was held not liable in tort for negligence. The act con­
1 (1 9 6 4 ). 49 M.P.R. 279.
2 [1914] 3 K.B. 607 at 611; [1914-15] All E.R. 511.
3 (1 7 9 9 ), 8 Term. R. 335, 101 E.R. 1419.
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templated in the contract was riding the mare, and the fact that 
the infant’s riding became excessive did not render him liable in 
tort. Finally, in Dickson Bros. Garage v. Woo Wai Jing4 an infant 
hired an automobile and while using it for the purpose permitted 
in the contract wrecked it by negligent driving. The plaintiif sued 
in tort and in contract. In this judgment, Jennings v. RundalF was 
applied to support the conclusion that since the act of the infant 
was not outside the purview of the contract, the infant could not 
be held liable in tort for his negligence.
The court in the instant case followed these decisions and 
held that since the plaintiff must have contemplated that the 
defendant would drive the car, and since there was no stipulation 
as to how he should drive it, the defendant had merely acted within 
the area contemplated by the contract.
The decision of the Court of Appeal was unquestionably a 
correct pronouncement of the current law. Since the tort could not 
be removed outside the bounds of the contract the action failed. 
Nevertheless, the result was clearly unjust and this injustice is seen 
to flow from the present state of the law respecting infants’ 
contracts. The law is set out in Halsbury:
An infant, being regarded as o f immature intelligence and dis­
cretion, is under a general incapacity to exercise the rights o f 
citizenship or perform civil duties; or to hold public or private 
offices or perform the duties incidental to them. For the same 
reason he is not, as a rule, permitted by law to  do anything pre­
judicial to his own interests. In accordance with this principle his 
capacity to bind him self by contract is limited to certain particu­
lar cases in which it is clearly for his benefit that he should be 
permitted to do so; other contracts by him being either voidable 
or, if manifestly prejudicial to his interests, absolutely void. The 
same principle regulates an infant’s capacity to acquire and dis­
pose o f property, and his incapacity in reference to legal pro­
ceedings instituted on his behalf or against him."
The Noble case clearly indicates that an infant can create a 
fraudulent situation and complacently hide behind the protection 
of the courts. During the twentieth century, and more particularly 
since the end of World War II, infants have acquired practically 
unlimited opportunities to contract because of the general accept­
ance and use of conditional sale agreements, increased spending 
power and increased freedom from parental influence and control.
4 (1 9 5 8 ), 11 D .L.R . (2 d ) 477.
5 Supra, note 3.
6 Halsbury’s Laws of England, 2nd ed., vol. 17, p. 586.
N ote: The third edition does not contain any statement as clear and 
concise as the second edition.
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As a result, the commercial world is being duped more and more 
by infants who are abusing their status to the point where one must 
consider whether the law is correct.
In view of these changed social conditions, it is submitted 
that the legal age of capacity should be lowered from twenty-one 
to eighteen. Although this change would necessarily have to be 
implemented by the legislature, such a step is by no means unpre­
cedented. There are three New Brunswick Statutes that have dealt 
with this problem.
In the Co-Operative Associations Act7 we see an exception to 
the general rule; a person between sixteen and twenty-one years 
of age will be bound by his acts as a member of a co-operative 
association whether or not such acts are prejudicial to his interests.
The second statute is the Insurance Act8 whereby an infant at 
sixteen can contract for life insurance which will be enforced as 
though he were twenty-one. Further, beneficiaries who are at least 
eighteen years of age can discharge an insurance company for 
money received as a beneficiary and such payor is assured the 
discharge will be binding on the infant.
The third statute which has lowered the age of capacity is 
the Mining Act.0 By this Act a youth of eighteen may obtain a
7 R.S.N.B., 1952, c. 40:
S. 18. Except where an Association is com posed o f  corporate m em ­
bers, or except under the provisions o f section 51, every member must 
be a person o f the full age o f twenty-one years provided, however, 
that an Association may, by supplementary by-law, reduce the age 
for membership to not less than sixteen years.
S. 19. A person under the age o f twenty-one years, who under a 
supplementary by-law may become a member, shall have power to 
execute all instruments and give all acquittances required o f a m em ­
ber under the provisions o f this Act or any regulation or by-law made 
hereunder.
8 R.S.N.B., 1952, c. 41, as amended 1960:
S. 154. Except in respect o f  his rights as beneficiary, a minor who has 
attained the age of sixteen years has the capacity o f  a person o f the 
age o f twenty-one years
(a )  to make an enforceable contract; and
(b ) in respect o f a contract.
S. 155. A beneficiary who has attained the age of eighteen years has 
the capacity o f a person o f the age o f twenty-one years to receive 
insurance m oney payable to him and to give a discharge therefor.
9 R.S.N.B., 1952, c. 45, as amended 1961-62:
S. 32. (1 )  Any natural person over eighteen years o f age may, on  
payment of the prescribed fee, obtain a prospecting license, Form A. 
S. 32. (1 0 )  A licensee under the age o f twenty-one years shall in 
respect of all mining claims or mining rights and all matters and 
transactions relating thereto have the same rights and be subject to 
the same obligations and liabilities as if he were o f full age.
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prospecting licence, thereby subjecting himself to the same obliga­
tions and liabilities as if he were of full age.
These statutory provisions make it clear that persons under 
the age of twenty-one who are enjoying the benefits allowed them 
by these statutes will be liable for their actions. There are, in 
addition, several areas of statute law affecting infants’ rights which 
are of a permissive nature. The Trustees ActJ0 states that an infant 
may act as a trustee. The Wills A ct11 declares that a married 
person, a member of the armed forces on active service, or a 
mariner or seaman while at sea can make and revoke a will even 
though in each case the person is under the legal age of twenty-one. 
Further, the County Courts Act12 and the County Magistrates A ct13 
allow a person under twenty-one years of age to sue for wages 
due to him in the same manner, and subject to the same liability 
for costs, as if he were of full age.
While it is clear that the legislature has made a start in chang­
ing the status of infants in some areas, it is submitted that this 
policy should be extended to other areas of the law. Under present 
conditions, as seen in the Noble case, a person twenty years of age 
who purports to be twenty-one can deceive a vendor, since infants 
nineteen to twenty-one often exhibit an air of maturity. However, 
if a seventeen-year-old purports to be eighteen, a vendor will be 
much more cautious before allowing him to take possession of an 
expensive item on credit. A person of that age will often portray 
an immature air which will immediately caution a vendor. In 
addition, persons seventeen years of age and under are normally 
under the influence of their parents or guardians thus allowing 
fewer instances where problems might arise.
Because of sociological changes and the need of the law to 
maintain the respect of citizens, it is submitted that the legislature 
should consider the above recommendations, particularly in the 
light of the decision in Bellefleur v. Noble’s Limited.
C. Gordon Simmons*
IN D IA N S — FEDERAL A N D  PRO VINCIAL STATUTES —  TREATY  
RIGHTS — H U N T IN G  A N D  FISH ING.
With the intent to save migratory birds “from indiscriminate 
slaughter” and to assure their preservation, Great Britain, on behalf 
of Canada, entered into a Convention with the United States, in
10 R.S.N.B., 1952, c. 239, s. 27.
11 R.S.N.B., 1952, c. 15, ss. 5 and 8, as amended 1959.
12 R.S.N.B., 1952, c. 45, s. 19.
13 R.S.N.B., 1952, c. 46, s. 3 3 (3 ) .
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